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I. INTRODUCTION 
With the advent of increased exchange rate flexibility, the role of 
policy and the transmission of economic disturbances under flexible rates 
have become topics of considerable interest. Fleming (1962) and Mundell (1963~ 
in their early analysis of the theory of policy in open economie~ emphasized 
the importance of the degree of capital mobility. Subsequently, a number 
of authors have analyzed the implications of the degree of capital mobility 
forexchange rate and income determination in open economies; see for example 
Kouri and Porter (1974), Branson (1975, 1979), Girton and Henderson (1976), and 
Turnovsky (1976). The polar case of perfect capital mobility has received 
most attention. 
Capital is perfectly mobile when investors consider domestic bonds, 
denominated in domestic currency, and foreign bonds, denominated in foreign 
currency, to be perfect substitutes. Two factors may cause perfect 
substitutability to break down. One is exahange r>isk: the values of the 
two bonds are defined in terms of different currencies and the exchange 
rate at the date of maturation is uncertain. The second is default r>isk: 
investors may perceive that foreign bonds are more subject to the risk 
of default than are domestic bonds. For one thing, in the event of default 
the investor must pursue his claim through a foreign legal system, which 
is likely to be costly. Aliber (1973) terms differences in default risk 
arising from the "foreignness" of assets as "political risk". 
Where domestic and foreign securities are assumed to be only imperfect 
substitutes, it is important to distinguish the degree of imperfect mobility 
due to these two sources of risk. While this distinction has been noted in 
optimal portfolio models developed by authors such as Kouri (1976) and 
Adler and Dumas (1977), it has not been brought out in the current macro 
literature. The objective of the present paper is to investigate the 
macroeconomic consequences of this distinction and to show how it may be 
crucial in assessing the effects of various macroeconomic disturbances under 
varying degrees of capital mobility. We- find that well-known results about 
i. 
the effects of increased capital mobility en the efficacy of monetary 
policy are correct when the increased mobility is due to a reduction in 
exchange risk, but not necessarily so when it is due to a reduction in 
· default risk. 
To carry out this analysis we derive the tmderlying behavioral 
relationships from an optimizing model of portfolio allocation and speculation 
in a stochastic. context in which both types of risk are present. ~f ~-h a 
model is first developed for a single risk averse investor in Section 2. 
A number of authors have developed financial ··models of currency speculation 
and foreign investment; see e.g. Solnik (1973), Grauer., Litzenberger and 
Stehle (1976), Kouri (1976), Adler and Dumas (1977), Roll and Solnik (1977), 
Frankel (1979), Fama and Farber (1979), Dornbusch (1980), Stein (1980). 
We find it useful to provide our own derivation, since other models either 
consider only exchange risk or make very restrictive assumptions about 
the interaction of exchange rates and prices. 
Section 3 uses these relationships, under the assumption that 
investors are i-0entical in each cotmtry, to formulate a general equilibrium 
macroeconomic model. We assume that the economy we consider is small, so 
that it treats certain characteristics of the foreign economy as parametric. 
Section 4 carries out certain comparative static exercises with this model. 
Specifically, it considers some important relationships between the available 
policy instruments and endogenous variables, and shows how these are 
affected by the degree of capital mobility in the two senses in which this 
term is defined. In particular, we show that, as long as there is a 
possibility of default, there exists an independent role for forward market 
intervention. In the limiting case of no default risk, when domestic and 
foreign bonds are perfect substitutes on a covered basis, this independent 
role ceases and forward market intervention becomes equivalent to bond 
market intervention. Secondly, the comparative statics of changes in the 
degree of capital mobility are discussed. Apart from the results on the 
3. 
effectiveness of monetary policy noted above, we also consider how varying 
degrees of capital mobility affect the response of the domestic economy 
to foreign shocks. 
2. OPTIMAL INVESTMENT AND PORTFOLIO BEHAVIOR 
Consider an open economy in which individuals plan over a two 
period horizon, one period of which is devoted to working, the other to 
retirement. 1 During period t members of the working generation earn labor 
income which they allocate between current cox1s_umption and savings, where 
savings can take the form of additions to holdings of domestic bonds, foreign 
bonds, and domestic money. 2 Assuming, for simplicity and without loss of 
generality, an initial wealth of zero, the budget constraint during this 




and wt = real wealth at time t, 
yt = real income at time t, 
real consumption at time t,ct = 
Mt = holdings of domestic money at time t, 
Bd 
t = holdings of domestic bonds, denominated in domestic currency, 
at time t, 
Bf 
t = holdings of foreign bonds, denominated in foreign currency, 
at time t, 
Es 
t = spot price of foreign currency in terms of domestic currency, 
at time t, 
pt = domestic price level at time t. 
In period t a working individual may also take a position in the fon,·ard 
market, but since this does not involve financial commitments during that 
period, this does not appear in the constraint (2.1). 
4. 
Domestic bonds pay a nominal interest rate 1t,while foreign bonds 
pay it. The nominal yield on domestic money is zero. We also assume that 
foreign bonds are subject to default with probability~. This risk, which 
we take to be exogenous, may be assumed to reflect "political" factors 
abroad, and applies symmetrically between the domestic and foreign economies. 3 
Forward contracts, like domestic bond holdings, are not subject to default 
risk. 
Under these assumptions, real resources available for consumption 
.,. : •··. 
during period t+l, the retirement period, are given by 
(l+~)B: + ~+l (l+ipE:+lB: + Mt + (E~+l 
(2. 3) 
where E! is the one-period forward price of ~orei8J1 currency, St is the 
forward purchase of foreign currency at the end of period t. The variable 
· ~+l is a dummy variable, taking on the value 1 if default on foreign bonds 
does not occur, and O otherwise. According to (2.3), real wealth available 
j 
l 
I at the end of period t+l consists of: domestic bonds, including the interest 
i 
i 
earned on them; the stock of foreign bonds valued at the end of period 
exchange rate, provided that there is no default, or zero otherwise; 
the stock of money; and the gains made through speculation in the forward 
market; all four of these quantities deflated at the end of period price 
For convenience, we shall define the share of wealth allocated to the 
three assets by 
AM(2 .4a) - (Mt/Pt)/Wt 
s fAF(2.4b) - (EtB/Pt)/Wt 
AD AM - AF(2 .4c) - (B:/Pt)/l\ = 1 
while analogously the real purchases of forward currency, as a ratio of 
wealth, can be defined by 
(2.4d) 
5. 
We shall assume that the individual's objective can be expressed 
in terms of the following two period utility fllllction 
(2 .5) 
That is, individuals are assumed to derive utility from consumption in 
period t and also from the consumption of their wealth in period t+l. 
In addition, following Fama and Farber (.1979), for example, we assume that 
holdings of real money balances facilitate current consumption, and hence 
. ·-
yield direct utility. While the procedure of introducing money into a 
utility function is a much argued one, because in our subsequent analysis 
we take domestic bonds to be riskless, it is necessary in order·to derive 
a well defined demand fllllction for money, Finally, note that, for simplicity, 
the utility function is assumed to be additively separable over time. 
M F SThe individual's problem is to choose Ct, A, A, and A where 
M F M F D we require Ct, A, A, 1 - A - A =A > 0 to maximize the expected value 
of (2.5) subject- to the budget constraints (2.1), (2.3). We shall assume 
. s 
that at the time these variables are chosen, Qt+l' Pt+l and Et+l are random 
variables. 
Individuals anticipate that ~+l will equal one with probability TI 
and zero with probability (1 - n). The domestic price level and the exchange 
rate are assumed to be generated by the stochastic processes 
(2 .6) =p +upPt+l t t+l 
(2. 7) 
where pt= ln Pt, e; = ln e:, and the random variables ui+l' u:+l are 
assumed to be normally distributed 
p N( a2)ut+ 1 "" P' p 
s N( o2)ut+l "" £, s 
6. 
and osp denotes the correlation between ui+l and u:+l· In general, these 
random variables are· functions of random variables of both domestic and 
foreign origin impinging on the economy. If, for example, exact purchasing 
,power parity (PPP) obtains, and the foreign price level is rising non-
stochastically at rate p*, then E = p ~ p* and o 2 = a 2 = a We assume s p sp 
that Qt+l is independent of both ui+l and u~+l; default risk on foreign 
bonds is independent of exchange risk and stochastic price movements. 
In order to derive explicit expressions-·for the optimal holdings of 
assetswe approximate the expectation of the objective function (2.5). 
To do this it is convenient to expand (2.5} in a second order Taylor 




Next, substituting the relationships (2.4) (2.7) into the expression for 
wealth in retirement years, (2.3), we obtain 
(2 .9) 
Under the above specifications of the stochastic processes generating 
Pt and E~, we may obtain approximations for the rates of return on money, 
domestic bonds, foreign bonds, and speculation, from which the corresponding 
means and variances can be calculated. These are presented in Table 1 
2 2below. These approximations assume that i, i*, p, E, o , o , 1-n andp s 
are sufficiently small to allow us to treat the product 
of any two of them as approximately zero. We define the real rate of 
s f freturn on speculation as (Et+l - Et)/Et](Pt/Pt+l). 
Table 1 
Real Rates of Return on Assets and Speculation 
Asset Real Rate of Return Expected Return Variance 
Money -p 
, 2





Substituting the expressions for the real rates of return into 
(2.9) we obtain the approximaUon 
(2.9') l\+l - l\ ~ {it(l->.M-,.F) + [~+l(i; + u!+l) - (1 - ~+l)]/ 
+ {u~+l - ft)As -· [l - AF(l - ~+l)]ui+1}wt 
Taking conditional expectations at time t yields 
(2 .10) Et(Wt+l - Wt)~ {it(l->.M-,.F) + [n(i* + e) - (1 - ,r)]>.F 
+ Ce - ft)"s - P}wt 
Next, squaring (2.9') and taking conditional expectations we derive 
2 
(2 .11) + cr p 
where all second or higher order terms are ignored as being negligible. 
Maximizing (2.8) subject to (2.1), incorporating (2.10) and (2.11), 
leads to the following first order optimality conditions 4 
u2'.(2.12a) 0u;1 lt = 
2 S 




(6et/R) + a - 11'0 ).
).S SE s(2 .12c) = 2 a 
s 
dl\+l}(2.12d) U' + E{u2' = 0C dCt 
where 6r : 11'(i* + E) - (1 - 11') - it t t 
measures the difference between the expected nominal interest rates 
on foreign and domestic bonds; 
is the expected excess of the spot rate in period t+l over the forward 
rate,where throughout the paper we shall use the notation xt . t to
+1, 
denote the expectation of x formed at time t for time t+i; and 
2" 2'
R = - -U Wt /U 
is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. The optimality conditions 
with respect to money and consumption, (2.12a) and (2.12b), are straight-
. 
forward and need not be discussed further. 
Of particular interest is the optimality condition for speculation, 
(2.12c). The three terms in the numerator of this expression correspond 
to three motives for taking a position in the forward market. 5 The 
first of these derives from currency speculation. The term 6et represents 
the expected gain from buying one unit of foreign currency in terms of 
2domestic currency. If R = 0 (investors are risk neutral) or if o = 0 
s 
(there is no exchange risk), a non-infinite speculative demand for forward 
exchange requires that the forward rate in period t represent an unbiased 
2prediction of the spot rate in period t+l. If Rt O and o = 0, a bias 
s 
may emerge. 
The second motive is to hedge against inflation risk. In the 
particular case in which exact PPP obtains and only the domestic price 
02 2level is uncertain, then 0 In ~his case, the second term of (2.12c)s = sp 
9. 
divided by the denominator equals unity. The individual sells 
his entire wealth forward to hedge against inflation risk. 
The third motive derives from fon.,Jard cover. In this case the 
individual sells a fraction of the total value of his foreign bonds forward 
equal to the probability of no default on these bonds. In the case in 
which there is no default risk, he covers the entire holdings of these 
bonds by a position in the forward market. 
Solving equations (2.12b) and (2.12c) ,s~ultaneously, one can 
obtain the following expression for the demand for foreign bond holdings 
in terms of the covered interest differential: 
(2.13) 
where 
Act= n(i; + ft) - (1-n) - it 
denotes the expected covered interest differential. In deriving (2.13) from 
(2.12b) and (2.12c) all terms of second order of sm~llness are ignored. 
When n = 1, (2.13) reduces to Act/0; in the absence of default 
risk the covered interest differential must be zero in order for the 
demand for foreign bonds to remain finite. The condition Act= 0 then 
reduces to the familiar covered interest parity (CIP) condition 
it= i* + ft t 
In this case >.Sand/ cannot be determined independently from (2.12b) 
and (2.12c). Rather, these two equations determine the net open position 
in foreign bonds 
F S (Aet/R) + asp




In this case it follows from CIP and the underlying stochastic process 
determining the exchange rate· that Aet = es - est+ it* - it' so thatt+l,t 
the relevant interest rate determining the demand for foreign bonds is the 
uncove11ed interest differential. 6 
i 
10. 
In the presence of default risk, however, the expected covered 
interest differential may deviate from zero since domestic and covered 
foreign bonds no longer represent perfect substitutes. In this case,to 
the first order of approximation,the demand for foreign bonds depends on 
the aovered interest differential, the probability of default and the 
degree of relative risk aversion. We have repressed second order te---ms 
which include, among other things,- the variance of the exchange rate. 
This term enters because, in the presence of-default risk, forward cover 
cannot eliminate exchange risk entirely. 
More specifically, the demand for foreign bonds will be affected 
negatively by the variance of the exchange rate. From (2.12c) the 
investor obtains forward cover on a fraction n of his total foreign bond 
holdings. If default risk does not occur he is subject to exchange risk 
on the remaining 1-n. If it does occur he must nevertheless honor a 
forward sale of foreign currency in amount of nAFWt. Uncertainty in the 
real value of these magnitudes rises with the variance of the exchange 
rate. However, this relationship is of second order of magnitude so does 
not appear in (2 .13). 
A set of equations analogous to (2.12) may be derived for a 
representative investor in the foreign country. In particular, if we 
denote the corresponding magnitudes with an asterisk, we obtain parallel1 
to (2.12c), (2.13~ respectively, 
2 F*-6et/R* - o no AAS* _____ sp* ___ = 2,,,__._._ s _(2.12c') 
a 
s 
F* { 6c*/R* }(2.13') A = max t , O 
(1-n) 
where 6c* = n(i - f) - (1 - n) - it*t t t 
Here we define AS* as foreign purchases of domestic currency forward and 
F*
A as foreign purchases of domestic bonds, each as shares of foreign 
real wealth. But for simplicity we assume that foreigners perceive 
the default risk on domestic bonds to be w. 
3. FOJU.n.JLATIQN. OF A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MACRO MODEL 
So far we have derived the optimal bond and forward position of 
a single optimizing individual who takes prices, interest rates and 
exchange rates as given. We now assume that this individual is representative 
of all portfolio maximizers in his own economy to characterize conditions 
for equilibrium in the money markets, forward market, and bond markets . 
., .- :~ ... 
Finally, we introduce assumptions about behavior in the commodity market that 
yield conditions for equilibrium in that market as well. Together, 
equilibrium conditions in these four markets constitute a general equilibrium 
macroeconomic system. To simplify the analysis we make the assumption that 
the domestic economy is small relative to the rest of the world so that 
it views the foreign price level and interest rate as parametric. 
3.1 Money Market Equilibrium 
Money market equilibrium in each ·cotmtry requires that 
(3.1) >.?\rt= Mt/Pt 
(3.2) 
where Wt now denotes domestic real national financial wealth and?-\· the 
domestic money supply. An asteri~k denotes parallel quantities abroad. 
Consider the domestic money market. The demand for money is 
defined implicitly by equation (2.12a). This equation may be combined 
with (2.1) and (3.1) to describe domestic money market equilibrium by 
(3. 3) 
It is interesting to note that given C, the demand for money depends only 
upon the domestic interest rate i and domestic output Y. Any other factors 
} . h fl h h t h . uence on C via t h opt1ro1 · 1tyw11c. 1n. uence 'M(.) do sot rough e1r. 1nfl , . e . 
condition (2.12d). Since our analysis does not purport to contribute 
anything new to the demand for money, we-shall simply assume that (3.3) 
can be adequately approximated by the log-linear relationship 
(3.4) 
where mt - tm Mt' pt= tn Pt, yt = 1n Yt·· In writing (3.4) we are in 
effect asswning that the critical elements influencing Care Y and i. 7 
3.2 Bond Market Equilibrium 






where Bt and a; denote the supplies of domestic and foreign bonds 
respectively. 
Expressing the expected covered interest rate differential as 
t:,,c
t 
= the real domestic demand for foreign 
bonds, obtained by combining (2.13) with (2.1), is given by 
(3. 7) 'FW = \F (1· * + ef - s . • ) (Y Ct)A t A t t et -- 1 t' 1 t t -
which we approximate by the log-linear relationship· 
(3.7') 
The tenn w
1, capturing the substitution effects between covered foreign 
and domestic bonds, is positive, and as default risk tends to zero, w1 ➔ ~. 
The sign of w~ is ambiguous, since it incorporates interest rate effects 
on savings and hence on l\. If savings is interest inelastic, then (2 .13) 
implies that We therefore assume that w2
F 
< 0. Thirdly, 





Finally, we should note that, as expression (2.13) indicates, foreign 
bond demand depends upon ,r as well. By assuming that this 
magnitude re-mains constant, it may be suppressed from the functions. 
The real domestic demand for domestic bonds, (1 - / 1 - :/)\\'
t 
is 
obtained residually from equations (2 .1), (3-. 3) and (3. 7). Analogously, 
13. 
the following log-linear approximation is adopted 
(3. 8) 
We have assumed alread~ that w1 > 0. Unless act/oit is highly positive, 
it seems reasonable to assume that the demand for domestic bonds varies 
Dpositively with the domestic interest rate so that w > 0. Since
2 
and are assumed to be positive functioDS 
of yt, the coefficient w~ is indeterminate a~d _so no sign restriction is 
imposed. 8 
The real supply of domestic bonds is given by Bt/Pt. Letting 





~ (Bt/Pt), the average stock of domestic bonds divided by 
the average price level, and. w 
'\, 
= w4 [1_- 1n w4 ]. We shall normalize units5 
so that 1n w = 1 and w = 0.
4 5 
To simplify the analysis we shall restrict ourselves to the case· 
in ~hich AF> 0 while AF*= O. From (2.13) and (2.12') observe that this 
case is more likely to arise when, among other things, the domestic price 
level is more highly correlated with the exchange rate than is the foreign 
price level. Combining (3.8) and (3.9), then, we obtain as a condition for 
equilibrium in the domestic bond market 
(3.10) 
(3.11) 
00In the limiting case in which-w1 ➔ , covered interest parity, it= i~ + et
f - et,s 
obtains. Otherwise, an increase in the covered foreign interest rate has 
a less than proportional effect on the domestic interest rate, while the 
14. 
the domestic interest rate responds positively to changes in the real 
bond supply and ambiguously to changes in income. 
3.3 Forward Market Equilibrium 
Equilibrium in the forward exchange market is described by 
(3.12) 
where Gt denotes the net government purchases of foreign currency in the 
· forward market translated to domestic currency uni ts at the foruazid exchange 
S S*rate. Substituting the expressions for). and). from (2.l2c) and (2.12c') 
into (3.12) we obtain F 
(3 .13) l1et [wt + /\t~ 





that is, the nominal value of foreign wealth translated to domestic currency 
units at the foPward rate and deflated by the domestic price level. 
The first term of (3.13) corresponds to the net spec:u.Zative demand 
for foreign currency forward. Its sign is given by 6et and its absolute 
magnitude depends negatively on the variance of the exchange rate and on 
the domestic and foreign coefficients of risk aversion. The second term 
denotes the net demand for foreign currency for arbitrage. The sign of 
this term depends on whether the domestic economy is a net importer or 
exporter of bonds. The third term of (3.13) is the net demand for foreign 
currency forward as an inflation hedge. Its sign depends upon the relative 
magnitudes of the correlation between the spot exchange rate and the price 
levels in each country. The fourth term is simply the government position 
in the market. 
The eauilibrium condit.ion (3_ 13) enahlec: 11c: .tn. dP.terrninP thP 
1S. 
relationship between the forward rate and the expected future spot rate. 
Specifically it can be seen that the forward rate is more likely to 
overpredict the expected future spot rate (6(\< 0) if: (1) the domestic 
price level is more correlated with the exchange rate than is the foreign price 
level, i. e ~ a > -a *, when the countries are of equal size in terms of weal th;sp sp · 
(2) the domestic cotmtry is larger in terms of weal th, while price 
variability is the same; (3) assets denominated in domestic currency 
exceed national wealth.10 Given these factors,· ·the degree of overprediction 
will be greater, the greater the degree of exchange rate variability a; 
and the degrees of relative risk aversion in each country. 
Since we treat os, 2 asp' Rand R* as constants and assume that 
F* 
~ = 0, we may represent the condition for forward market equilibrium, 
incorporating (3.7) and the definition of 6et, as 
(3.14) 
where gt= tn Gt and~= Gt/Pt. Here we have used.a log-linear approximation 
to Gt/Pt similar to the one applied to Bt/Pt above. 
3.4 Commodity Market Equilibrium 
We assume that the prices of some tradable commodities are established 
in auction markets while the prices of other tradable and nontradable 
commodities are established by contract in the previous period. The prices 
of the first type of commodities are hence flexible within the period, while 
the prices of the latter group are fixed. The prices that are flexible 
are determined by the international law of one price. Thus 
(3.15) PA = p* + ets 
t t 
where ptA denotes the logarithm of the price index of the flexibly-priced 
commodities. Prices that are established by contract, we assume, are 
set at the price level expected to obtain in the relevant period, as of 
16. 
the previous period. Our assumption here parallels the contract theory 
of wage determination of Gray (1976), Fischer (1977) and Phelps and 
Taylor (1977). Thus, we have 
(3.16) 
where the superscript C denotes the contract-priced goods. The overall 
price index is therefore 
(3.17) 
where 6 is the share of the flexibly-priced coJ1D11odities. As long as 
Pi and e: are imperfectly correlated, an increase in 6 raises the correlation 
between the domestic price level and the exchange rate, asp· 
Finally, we assume that the deviation of output from its natural 
level y is determined by the unanticipated component of the domestic price 
level. That is, 
(3.18) e > o = 
where we normalize units by setting y = 0. Such a specification fol lows 
from the contract theory of wage determination referred to above. 11 
Together, the conditions for money market equilibrium, (3.4), 
bond market equilibrium, (3.10), ·forward market equilibrium, (3 .14), and 
the price and output equations, (3.17) and (3.18)1 constitute a complete 
macroeconomic model of a small open economy. The system of equations 
determines equilibrium_values of the five endogenous variables Pt, it, 
s f set, et and yt in terms of the expectations et+l,t' Pt,t-l and the exogenous 
variables, mt, bt, gt, i; and p;, as well as the structural parameters 
of the system. To close the model we assume that expectations are formed 
rationally; i.e.,that price and exchange rate expectations are formed 
on the basis of the model itself and all available information. 
We now use the model to contrast the effects of two different ~•ays 
in which capital can become more mobile. On the one hand, exchange risk 
17. 
or aversion to exchange risk may fall. This will be reflected by an 
increase in the parameter y. As a consequence, the forward rate will 
become more closely tied to the expectation of the future spot rate. 
On the other hand, default risk or aversion to default risk may fall, 
raising the parameter w
1
. As a consequence, the domestic interest rate 
will be determined more closely by .the covePed interest parity condition. 
We show that the way in which capital mobility is increased has important 
implications for the response of the economy ··1:·o .._a monetary disturbance. 
4. COMPARATIVE STATICS 
· In the model contained in equations (3,4), (3.10), (3.14), (3.17) 
and (3.18), individuals' expectations about the future influence their 
current behavior. As is well known (c.f. Taylor (1977)), when expectations 
are formed rationally, such models have non-unique solutions. There is 
only one solution to this model, however, for which the exchange rate and 
the price level remain botmded into the-infinite future. We focus on this 
solution to the model. 
Our purpose in solving the model is to analyze the response of the 
economy to changes in the policy variables mt, bt and gt and also to changes 
in the foreign variables ii and Pi· Disturbances in the exogenous variables 
may be distinguished by a number of characteristics: (a) their expected 
permanence or transcience, (b) the extent to which they are anticipated 
or unanticipated, (c) whether they occur immediately or are announced in 
advance. In principle, we could analyze the effects of many specific 
types of disturbances, We shall limit ourselves, however, to two types. 
First, we will consider the effect on impact of disturbances that are 
(a) unannounced, (b) unanticipated, and (c) expected to last only one 
period; second, we will consider the effects in steady state of changes in 
the exogenous variables that are perceived as permanent. 
To analyze the effect of a temporary, unanticipated disturbance 
in period t we may assume, without loss of generality, that 
18. 
mt,t = bT,t - gt,t - P;,t = i;,t = 0, t > t implying that e:+l,t = O, 
while mt,t = bt,t = gt,t z P;,t = i~,t = 0, t < t which implies that 
Pt,t-l z O. The reduced form expressions for the endogenous variables 
are easily obtained by· solving the five equations of the system with 
these assumptions. However, the expressions are messy and we do not 
report them explicitly. 
To analyze the steady-state effects of permanent changes in the 
•.• .. 
- . s s -s 
exogenous variables we set Pt,t-l =pt= p and et+l,t =et= e, where 
-x denotes the steady state value of x. Again the expressions are tedious 
and are not reported. 
4.1 Money Market, Bond Market and Forward Market Intervention 
The government can affect the domestic economy by changing the supply 
12 
of money, the stock of domestic bonds, and its forward market position. 
Manipulation of each instrument impinges initially on different markets 
and has differential effects on domestic income, the price level, and the 
interest rate. The three policy instruments are linearly independent except 
in some special cases. We summarize the most important relationships between 
policy instruments and endogenous variables: 
1. The effect, on impact, of an unantioipated, transitory increase in 
mt, bt or gt is expansionary. As is well known, increasing mt or bt 
raises nominal wealth above its desired level at initial commodity prices. 
Prices that are flexible rise, inducing an expansion in income. An increase 
in gt' government holdings of foreign exchange forward, raises e: and hence 
the rate of return on oovered foreign bonds. Individuals' demand for 
money and domestic bonds falls so that a higher price level is required to 
_ equate demand to the existing nominal stocks. For similar reasons, the 
steady state effect of permanent increases in mt, bt and gt is to raise 
yt remains fixed at its long-rWl natural level. 
2. A permanent increase in mt lowers the domestic and covered foreign 
interest rates, while a pennanent increase in bt or gt does the opposite; 
bt has relatively more impact on the domestic rate while gt has relativ~ly 
greater influence on the covered foreign rate. 
3. In the limit as the probability of default goes to zero, w
1 
+ m, 
.and covered interest parity obtains. In this case bt and gt affect all 
domestic variables in the same linear proportions, w4bt + Agt. In other 
words, bond market and forward market intervention become equivalent in 
their effects on all endogenous variables; either one is therefore redundant. 
4. In the limit as either the degree of risk aversion or exchange risk 
goes to zero, y + m and forward market intervention ceases to have an effect 
on any endogenous variable. Any forward market intervention by the 
monetary authority is exactly offset by the actions of speculators. 
5. In the limit as both exchange risk and default risk go to zero, (or 
else risk aversion goes to zero) both y +•and w1 + m and neither bond 
market nor forward market intervention can have any effect. The familiar 
proposition that fiscal policy (i.e. a change in the government deficit 
unaccompanied by changes in the money supply) is ineffective under flexible 
rates and perfect capital mobility (see Mundell (1963)) is true only if 
perfect capital mobility is interpreted to mean. an abs~nce of default risk 
and exchange risk. Otherwise, fiscal policy is still effective. 
4.2 Capital Mobility, the International Transmission of Disturbances 
and the Role of Policy 
In terms of our model, an increase in capital mobility can be 
interpreted to mean either (1) a diminution of default risk or aversion 
to default risk (an increase in w1) or (2) a diminution in exchange risk 
or aversion to exchange risk (an increase in y). While a number of studies 
have emphasized the importance of the degree of capital mobility for both 
the efficacy of policy and the international transmission of disturbances, 
no distinction has been made in this literature, to our knowledge, hetween 
the two wars in which it can ·occur. 
In fact, an increase in capital m~bility in either sense tends to 
increase.the sensitivity of the domestic economy to foreign disturbances. 
I 
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The response vf the domestic interest rate[at:]a change in the foreign 
interest rate, whether it is transitory or permanent (ll*ai) aii 
increases with an increase in either w or y. Likewise, the1 
response of the domestic Jrice level to a transitory increase in the 
foreign price level [::~ ~ncreases with both ~1 and y, while the 
an .steady-state response -=- 1s always zero.
ap* 
Increased capital mobility in.its two different forms, however, can 
have very different implications for the effec~~ of domestic policies. For 
example, a reduction in exahange Pisk or aversion to exchange risk always 
increases the steady-state responses of the exchange rate and price level 
to permanent changes in the domestic money supply. This is because as y 
increases, the steady ·state forward and spot rates move closer together, 
and the covered foreign exchange rate becomes less flexible, as does the 
domestic interest rate. As a result, more of the change in the money 
supply must be reflected in a higher price level and exchange rate and less 
in a lower interest rate. 
By contrast, a reduction in aversion to default risk has an ambiguous 
effect on the steady-state relationship between the money supply and price 
level. An increase in w1 raises or lowers the term ap/am as 
(4 .1) 
The reason for the ambiguity is as follows. An increase in w always ties1 
the domestic interest rate more closely to the covered foreign interest rate. 
When y is large the covered and 1.mcovered foreign rates are close, so that 
a reduction in default risk ties the domestic interest rate more closely 
to the uncovered foreign rate as well, so that it is less flexible. As 
with a reduction in exchange risk, then, more of a change in money supply 
must be absorbed by the price level rather than by the interest rate. 
When y is small, however, the covered and uncovered for.dgn rates can diverge, 
5and the increase in m can be accompanied by a fall in} and ef - e • lf 
w 
F 
2 is large then the fall in i raises the demand for cc:'e!'ed foreign bonds. 
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The consequent increase in the sale of foreign exchange forward from 
arbitrage requires, for forward market equilibrium, offsetting 
-s -fspeculation; e - e must consequently rise to elicit thi~ speculation. 
The interest rate on covered foreign bonds, i* + ef - es, therefore falls, 
-inducing a further fall in the domestic interest rate i. Increased capital 
mobility in this sense can therefore make the domestic interest rat~.nvre 
( .· 
flexible. In other words, an increase in the degree of capital mobility, 
in the sense of domestic and covered foreign'·bonds becoming closer 
substitutes, can reduce the rise in the price level and increase the change 
in the interest rate resulting from a monetary expansion. 
S. CONCLUSION 
Exchange risk and political risk both diminish the mobility of 
capital. Macroeconomic analyses of open economies have emphasized the 
importance of the degree of capital mobility but have not, typically, 
distinguished between. these two impedim~nts of mobility. In fact, they 
impinge on the economy in different ways. On the OJ)e hand, exchange 
risk creates a divergence between the forward exchange rate and the spot 
rate expected to prevail when the forward contract matures, in turn 
creating a divergence between the expected rates of return on covered and 
uncovered foreign bonds. Exchange risk does not, however, affect the 
relationship between the covered foreign interest rate and the domestic 
interest rate. Political risk, on the other hand, weakens this second 
relationship, but does not affect the first. 
In the absence of both exchange risk and political risk, i.e. if 
capital is perfectly mobile, changes in the supply of domestic bonds or 
_ i~ the government's forward position have no effect on the domestic economy. 
Only changes in the money supply have an impact. Introducing exchange 
risk alone makes bond market and forward market intervention effective, 
although their effects are not linearly independent. They are essentially 
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equivalent and one or the other is redundant. Alternatively, introducing 
default risk alone gives efficacy to bond market intervention, but not 
to forward market intervent~on. Finally, if both exchange and default 
risk are present, then·forward market, bond market, and money market 
intervention all have independent effects on the economy. 
An increase in capital mobility due to the diminution of the 'ffects 
of either type of risk increases the sensitivity of the domestic interest 
rate to the foreign interest rate and the s~nsltivity of the domestic 
price level to the foreign price level. An increase in capital mobility 
in the form of an increase in the elasticity of speculation increases the 
steady state effect of a change in the money supply on the domestic price 
level. However, an increase in capital mobility that takes the form of 
decreasing the divergence between the domestic and foreign covered interest 
rates has an ambiguous effect on the relationship between money and the 
price level. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. The "life cycle" context is convenient in that it allows us to ignore 
the correlation betwe·en earned income in the second period and the 
rates of return on assets. Introducing nonwealth income in the second 
period poses no conceptual problems, but clutters the analysis. See 
Frankel (1979) for a model which does introduce other sources of income 
and discusses their consequences. 
2. We assume that domestic bonds and money are outside assets; i.e. , they 
constitute net wealth. Frankel (1979) has shown that if no nominally 
denominated assets are net wealth, the forward rate equals the expectation 
of the future spot rate. Even if bonds do not constitute net wealth, 
however, a bias emerges as long as money is .. considered to be part of 
weal th. ··· : · ·,. 
3. See Kenen (1965) for an early analysis of the forward market incorporating 
potential default. Political risk may derive from the threat of exchange 
controls as well as from the threat of outright debt repudiation. In either 
case the risk may not be the loss of the total net worth of the investment. 
When the threat derives from exchange controls, the expected value of net 
worth may even be preserved, but if payment is delayed, forward cover 
obtained for the investment will no longer be appropriate. For our purposes 
it is the risk that repayment not occur on the date for which the forward 
cover is arranged, thereby exposing the investor to exchange risk, that 
is relevant. Our analysis could easily be modified to incorporate a 
preservation of some or all net worth in the event of default. See Eaton 
and Gersovitz (1981) for a model in which the probability of default is 
endogenous. 
4. We shall let primes denote derivatives and shall denote partial derivatives 
by corresponding lower case subscripts. 
5. The first and third motives are equivalent to what Kenen (1965) terms 
the demand for forward cover by speculators and arbitrageurs. Kenen 
also identifies a third source as demand by traders, which does not 
seem to be the exact equivalent to our demand as an inflation hedge. 
6. A common specification of imperfect capital mobility in the macro literature 
is to specify the demand for bonds as being proportional to the unaovered 
interest differential. It is evident from our analysis that procedure is 
consistent with portfolio maximization only in the absence of default risk. 
7. For the case in which the utility function is logarithmic, C will depend 
only upon Y. 
8. Expressions (3.3), (3.7) and (3.8) implicitly define a savings function, 
which will be highly nonlinear in form. Lucas (1975) follows a similar 
procedure of defining all assets demand flDlctions explicitly in log-linear 
form, with a savings function being defined residually. 
9. The approximation in (3.9) is obtained as follows 
p 
lB - B p -Bt "' B = t t -= - + -B [\- fi] :[\- p] w +- (1pt p p 4 B p 
Bt - B ~ 8 -tNow tn[ 1 + BJ = tn Bt/8 = - R.n s.bt
B a 
p - pt '\,Similarly = pt - 1n P so that 
p 
10. Adding the domestic money market equilibrium condition (3.1) to the domestic 
bond market equilibrium condition (3.5) yields: 
AF*EsP*W*/P AFW = (Mt + Bt)/Pt - wt .,. :_--..
t t t t t 
Thus 
Foreigners1 holdings of domestic bonds must be adjusted by the forward 
premium in calculating the real level of assets denominated in domestic 
currency. 
11. Equation (3.18) may be obtained in the following way: Assume that all 
wages are determined by one-period ahead contracts so that we may set 
wt= pt t-l' where wt is the logarithm of the wage in period t. In the 
contract-price sector the wage divided by the output price is constant 
as are output and employment. Thus we may set Yt = 0, where y~ is the 
logarithm of the output of the contract-price sector. In the flexible­
price sector the wage divided by the output price is inversely proportional 
to the price level. Thus output and employment expand when prices are 
high and conversely. Defining ~ as the output of the flexible-price 
sector, we have 
8' > 0 
or, substituting (3.15) and (3.17), 
where e = 8'/6. 
12. Elsewhere (Eaton and Turnovsky (1980)) we discuss how these three forms 
of intervention are related by the balance-sheet constraint of the 
combined monetary-fiscal authority. 
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